LIBYA

Libya has one of the highest criminality scores in Africa, ranking 7th overall, with the highest score in North Africa.

As with the majority of African countries, Libya’s high overall criminality score is driven by a higher score for criminal actors than for criminal markets. The two types of criminal actor that have the most influence in Libya are mafia-style groups and state-embedded actors.

Various mafia-style militia groups control many areas across the country. They are heavily involved in many criminal markets, including drug trafficking, human smuggling, human trafficking and illicit oil smuggling. Libya essentially has two competing governments, both with close links to militia groups and criminal actors. In some cases, they feed off one another, making the political process indirectly dependent on the proceeds of organised crime.

With regards to criminal markets pervasive in Libya, human trafficking has a severe negative influence on nearly all parts of society. The country has the highest score in Africa (9.5) and the situation is deteriorating. Four other criminal markets have a severe influence in Libya – human smuggling, arms trafficking, non-renewable resource-crimes and the cannabis trade – illustrating the breadth of organised criminal activity affecting the country.

While Libya has one of the highest levels of organised crime in Africa, it is also one of the worst-performing countries on the continent for resilience to organised crime. Ranking 47th in Africa, the country’s regulatory or institutional frameworks in relation to the 12 building blocks of resilience are almost all either non-existent or extremely ineffective.

The exception is law enforcement, in which the country performs marginally better, with a score of 4. In relation to organised crime, the complete absence of political leadership, anti-money laundering capacity, victim and witness support or prevention measures has placed Libya in an extremely perilous situation.
Criminal Markets

Libya has an extremely high criminal markets score, ranking 6th in Africa. Five of the ten criminal markets captured in the Index score 8 or higher, indicating a severe influence on society and state structures.

By far the most pervasive criminal market in the country is human trafficking, which scores 9.5. This is the highest score in Africa not only for human trafficking, but for any of the ten criminal markets. Kidnapping for ransom involving migrant workers is extremely common in Libya. The incidence of labour exploitation and forced prostitution is also very high. While there is little documentation and no real data on the subject, monitoring in the country strongly suggests that these activities have been on the rise in the past couple of years, particularly kidnapping for ransom. The ruthless exploitation of migrants is notable and builds on an entrenched culture where labour exploitation of sub-Saharan migrants is widespread.
Arms trafficking in the country is almost as ubiquitous, scoring 8.5. The overthrow of the regime of Muammar Gaddafi, following the outbreak of civil war in 2011, led to the proliferation of illicit arms. Old government arms stocks in Libya have fuelled conflicts in the region, with militias seeking to buy these weapons. Recently, new arms stocks have come into the mix, affecting the political trajectory of the country. Various armed factions have sought to arm themselves, evident in the fight for control of the capital Tripoli.

Non-renewable resources play a pivotal role in the country’s instability, as oil is a key determinant of the criminal hierarchy in Libya. Libya scores 8.5 for non-renewable resource crimes, one of the highest scores on the continent. Oil products such as petrol and diesel are at the centre of the smuggling industry, but much of the fuel smuggled out of the country is actually imported rather than produced in the country.

When fuel enters the country, it is put on the market at a heavily subsidised rate, which provides significant profit margins to the smugglers. Since 2017, there has been a substantial decline in large-scale maritime fuel smuggling, which was the most substantial mafia-type activity associated with this industry. At the same time, however, overland fuel smuggling across Libya’s borders and within the country is rife.

While human smuggling proliferated in Libya post-2011, since July 2017 there has been a substantial decline in this activity and the protection offered by militia groups. Nevertheless, the practice exists at much higher levels than in neighbouring countries, scoring 8 in the Index. Human smuggling is closely linked to militia groups that are preventing a peaceful political transition in Libya and state consolidation. Profits from the trade fund territorial control and purchases of weapons, which affects governance and security in many parts of the country.

However, smaller and less organised smuggling groups also operate. Inter-group competition directly related to control over the smuggling economy is triggering local violence and conflict, resulting in displacement and deaths among local populations. The smuggling trade is also associated with high levels of violence against migrants, high rates of migrant deaths and associated forms of human trafficking, including kidnapping for ransom, extortion, forced labour and sexual exploitation.

Lastly, the illicit cannabis trade is highly pervasive in Libya, given its role as a transit country for cannabis being trafficked from Morocco to the Balkans. The trade funds a number of criminal networks that move the product, resulting in a score of 8. Similarly, the synthetic drugs trade in Libya scores 7.5, due to the increasing prevalence of tramadol and other prescription drugs such as Rivotril (clonazepam) and Captagon (fenethylline), which are smuggled from abroad through the country’s ports, as well as over its southern borders.

Criminal Actors

Libya has the 9th highest score in Africa for criminal actors, which is driven by extremely influential mafia-style groups and state-embedded actors. Libya has various mafia-style militia groups, each with its own name and clearly identifiable leaders. These groups are well-armed and dominate different markets, including migrant smuggling, protection payments, drugs, fuel, arms, and human trafficking. Libya scores 8 for mafia-style groups; in some areas, they have more control than the government.

State-embedded actors in Libya are similarly influential and also score 8 in the Index. Libya’s state structure is weak and fragmented, and in some areas militias control the government. The proximity of militia groups and criminal actors to the political class explains developments in organised crime in Libya. In some cases, they feed off one another, making the political process indirectly dependent on the proceeds of organised crime.

Criminal networks in Libya, which score 6.5 in the Index, are generally characterised by separate families that use quasi-corporate structures to import and export a wide range of commodities. These actors often have political affiliations, and also operate in human smuggling.

Foreign actors, however, are far less involved in organised crime in Libya than in most other nations across Africa, scoring 4. Given the country’s historically strong state structure, few foreign actors have been able to gain control of criminal markets. Rather, such control has been in the hands of corrupt state actors and more recently militias. One of the few criminal markets that foreign criminal actors play a role in is arms trafficking, supplying the militias.
Libya has some of the lowest levels of resilience to organised crime, ranking 47th in Africa. Libya’s regulatory or institutional frameworks in relation to the 12 building blocks of resilience are almost all either non-existent or extremely ineffective. In relation to organised crime, the complete absence of political leadership, anti-money laundering capacity, victim and witness support and prevention measures puts Libya in a perilous situation. It scores 1 for each of the four building blocks mentioned.

Almost as poorly developed and regulated are Libya’s national policies and laws on organised crime, and the judicial system and detention framework, which score 2 and 2.5, respectively. The judicial system lacks the capacity required to make significant inroads into countering the organised crime hierarchies in the country.

High levels of corruption and fragmentation also inhibit its proper functioning.

The non-state actors indicator also scores poorly in the Index, rated 3 due to the severe suppression of the media and constant threats of violence to journalists. Nevertheless, there have been attempts to address organised crime at community level.

The only indicator of resilience deemed to be moderately effective in Libya is law enforcement, where the country receives a score of 4, which is the median score for African nations. Libya’s law enforcement is essentially ‘outsourced’ to various militia groups, some of which have even aimed to address forms of organised crime.