The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) ranks 2nd in Africa criminality, with eight out of ten criminal markets scoring above 5, and all criminal actor types scoring 8 or above.

A relatively notable differential between the two criminality subcomponents suggests that criminal actors drive the DRC’s overall criminality score.

In terms of criminal markets, environmental crimes consistently have high scores, with concerns that illegal logging, poaching and wildlife trafficking are rife. Most notable, however, are non-renewable-resource crimes. Actors, from government forces to rebel militia, are involved in, and benefit from, the illicit trade of gold and criminal control of artisanal mining of conflict minerals and cobalt. These mines are also hotspots for the pervasive human trafficking and human smuggling markets.

Armed mafia-style groups, and national and international criminal networks, are involved in high levels of organised crime throughout nearly all criminal markets and there is a high level of corruption within the government. This directly impacts the DRC’s resilience to organised crime and hinders all operations within the country. Across all resilience indicators, there is a marked lack of capacity to prevent and combat organised crime, and it is therefore entrenched in society. The DRC ranks 50th in Africa for resilience.
Criminal Markets

With the exception of drug markets, nearly all criminal markets in the DRC are described as exerting a severely negative influence on society. Arms trafficking is pervasive, with hundreds of thousands of small arms circulating among the general population. Government officials reportedly supply armed groups with weapons, and the increase in rebel groups operating in the country has created a very high demand for illicit arms and ammunition. Many rebels are deserters from the country’s national army, but maintain close links with their former colleagues in the military. These links are described as leading to massive diversions of government arms stocks into illicit circulation.

Non-renewable-resource crimes, particularly the illicit trade of gold, are widespread in the DRC. Armed groups, from government forces to rebel militia, are involved in and benefit from the trade. The country
is a source of artisanally sourced gold, and cobalt is smuggled out of the country to international markets. Widespread corruption in the cobalt trade, combined with abuses at and around cobalt mine sites and links to state-sanctioned violence, are a crucial pillar of other organised crime activities, including arms trafficking and human trafficking.

**Flora crimes** and **fauna crimes** score 8.5 and 8, respectively, indicating that both markets exert a severely negative influence on society. The illegal logging and charcoal trades are described as significant problems within the DRC. In 2015, nearly all of the DRC’s total timber production was estimated to be illegal. Timber from the DRC is trafficked east, west and south through neighbouring countries. Inspections of the country’s industrial logging concessions reveal illegality in all cases, including logging outside of permit areas, felling of protected species, overexploitation, and the falsification of records and export permits. The charcoal trade is also reported to provide significant income to criminals and militias.

Poaching of elephants continues to be of considerable concern in the DRC, with the country playing a major role in the international supply chain of illegal ivory. Accounts state that the ivory market in the capital Kinshasa remains open. But, in light of increasing law enforcement actions, the trade appears to be increasingly shifting underground. Species such as bonobos, chimpanzees and gorillas are also vulnerable, due to illegal bushmeat hunting. Poaching has greatly affected Kordofan giraffes, with only around 40 remaining in Garamba National Park in the north-east of the country. The trafficking of grey parrots from the DRC seems to be remerging, mainly due to the illegal pet trade.

With the exception of the **cannabis trade**, drug markets in the DRC have low scores compared to other illicit economies in the country. The DRC is a source country for cannabis trafficked to neighbouring markets, including in Uganda and Burundi; a destination market for cannabis; and a trans-shipment point for cannabis moving to markets in North Africa and Southern Africa and other trans-shipment points. Domestic insecurity, the influence of armed groups in border areas, and the porosity of the country’s national borders mean the trade operates largely unchecked. Cannabis is reported to be widely used in the DRC. Also, up to 95% of children recruited in armed conflicts are introduced to drugs, most commonly cannabis.

**Criminal Actors**

Numerous **criminal actors** play a major role in the DRC’s overall criminality, with all four criminal actor types scoring 8 or higher. More than 100 armed groups are active in the eastern DRC’s North Kivu and South Kivu provinces. Many groups attack civilians and are involved in illicit activities. For example, in 2017, militia fighters killed national rangers in Virunga National Park, suggesting their involvement in wildlife crimes. Income from these illicit activities enables defeated or disarmed groups to continue to resurface and destabilise the region.

**Criminal networks** are also pervasive, with an estimated 98% of the net profit from illegal natural resource exploitation – particularly gold, charcoal and timber – going to transnational organised criminal networks operating in and outside the DRC. State-embedded actors are also known to engage in environmental crimes. Although no cases have been confirmed of the military recruiting child soldiers, there are multiple reports of the national army collaborating with proxy militias that do recruit children.

A number of foreign communities from Asia and the Near East are identified as being involved in organised criminal activities in the DRC, particularly in the trade in non-renewable resources. Criminal gangs from neighbouring countries also operate in areas bordering the DRC and are active in smuggling drugs, weapons and wildlife products.
In addition to having one of the highest rankings on the continent for criminality, the DRC ranks 50th for resilience, with one of the lowest scores in Africa. Political leadership and governance in the country is weak. The participation of customs officials, police, members of the military, politicians, customary chiefs and other officials in illicit activities – particularly in the environmental sector – undermines the legitimacy and effectiveness of their respective institutions and fuels instability in the country. Although the government has officially established a legal anti-corruption framework, its enforcement is very weak and corruption is described as an endemic problem.

The DRC has acceded to a number of international treaties on organised crime, with the notable exception of the Arms Trade Treaty. Although national policies and laws on organised crime are in place, such as those pertaining to wildlife crimes, they are poorly implemented and are used to extort individuals and the population. The judicial system and courts in the country are underfinanced, overburdened and lacking in trained personnel and basic resources. The judiciary lacks independence and suffers from widespread political interference, as the government utilises courts to target political opposition.

Law enforcement in the DRC is limited. Many interactions with the police are marked by demands for money and corruption is rampant, due to low salaries and poor treatment of officers. Given the limited capacity of security forces and local police in many parts of the DRC, communal and ethnic militia (often called Mai Mai, armed groups and criminal elements are able to act with impunity. This situation affects law enforcement along the borders, which are described as highly porous, allowing criminal actors to operate freely. Allegedly, there are more unofficial border points than monitored official ones.

The DRC’s economic environment is described as extremely ineffective, with anti-money laundering and economic regulatory environment indicators scoring 2.5 and 3, respectively. Rampant corruption and inadequate supervision have left the country’s banking system vulnerable to money laundering. Relations with international financial institutions have been poor since 2012, when the IMF ended the DRC’s concessional lending programme due to a lack of transparency in state mining contracts. Most companies operate in the grey economy, as businesses find it hard to operate in an environment of high formal and informal taxes, in addition to high levels of corruption. Around 70% of the economy is estimated to be informal, creating the conditions in which criminal activities can take place unchecked.

Finally, the DRC scores very poorly on social resilience indicators. Support for victims and witnesses of organised crime and witness protection programmes are almost non-existent, though some victims are referred to NGOs and international organisations for assistance on an ad
hoc basis. The absence of rule of law in the DRC means most victims do not trust the system. Denunciations of abuse are likely to lead to reprisals, and victims have little to no recourse or state protection, especially in cases where state agents are the perpetrators. Notably, however, the country has made efforts to reduce the demand for forced labour in artisanal mining.

Civil society in the DRC comprises a range of actors, including the Catholic Church, focusing on the social and economic development of communities, particularly in the non-renewable resources sector. Civil society and the media operate in a complex social, economic, cultural and political environment and struggle against political manipulation. A government crackdown on criticism has pushed civil society actors into pro-government or pro-opposition camps. It has featured ‘disappeared journalists’ – in 2018, two journalists were killed and two went missing in the DRC – and the blocking of protests. There is little to no protection for peaceful protests in the DRC and thus recourse to armed violence.