ALGERIA

Algeria ranks 40th in Africa in the Index, and 5th out of the six countries in North Africa, placing it in the bottom third of the criminality ranking for Africa overall.

The country’s scores for criminal markets and criminal actors are both relatively and equally low in comparison to other countries on the continent, suggesting neither component is disproportionately driving the overall criminality score.

The criminal market with the highest score in Algeria is non-renewable-resource crimes, driven almost exclusively by illegal oil smuggling into neighbouring countries. Algeria has also received a high score for the cannabis trade, which is perhaps unsurprising given its proximity to Morocco.

Finally, human smuggling also has a high score, the result of the country’s geographical position on the Mediterranean and, crucially, sharing borders with Morocco and Libya. State-embedded actors receive the highest score among criminal actors, because of high levels of corruption in the regime of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika.

In terms of resilience, Algeria ranks 15th on the continent and 3rd regionally, reflecting a relatively high resilience to organised crime. While scoring impressively on indicators such as national policies and laws and territorial integrity, there is significant scope for improvement with regard to indicators such as government transparency and accountability and anti-money laundering.

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Criminal Markets

Unlike in many other African nations, there are no criminal markets in Algeria that exert a strong influence. However, certain criminal markets do have a significant influence on society and state structures, not least non-renewable-resource crimes, which score 7 in the Index. Algeria experiences high levels of oil smuggling and, according to government sources, the value of the illicit oil smuggling market exceeds US$1 billion a year.

Algeria is a major oil-producing country, where fuel is heavily subsidised. Given large price differentials, massive quantities of oil are diverted to neighbouring countries – such as Tunisia, Morocco, Mali, Niger and Mauritania – through local smuggling networks. While oil-smuggling operations are geographically limited, the net loss to the Algerian people as a whole is significant, characterised by a loss of revenue and pervasive corruption within the state apparatus.
Gold trafficking has become increasingly prevalent in the far south, in the Tamanrasset region. Gold trafficking attracts Algerians as well as foreign actors, mainly Nigeriens and Chadians. Unlike in other countries in the Sahel, illegal gold extraction is not controlled by barons or armed groups, but rather the illicit market remains an opportunistic and ad hoc business. However, more organised and experienced foreign groups have started to enter southern Algeria, as Algerian nationals leave after the first gold rush.

The 'Cocainegate' scandal in May 2018 offered a glimpse of the extent to which high-ranking officials and businesspeople are connected to criminal economies. Furthermore, cronyism in the illicit oil market is widespread, contributing to significant losses to public revenues.

Criminal networks also have a significant negative influence on large parts of society, due to their involvement in major criminal markets, such as the illicit non-renewables market and the cannabis trade. Criminal networks with significant transnational linkages are involved in long-standing hashish-trafficking activities, smuggling of basic daily commodities (particularly along the country’s southern border and the illicit trafficking of oil (along all borders).

These actors are also involved in human smuggling, the illicit gold trade and arms trafficking. Their activities are associated with levels of violence, from low (particularly in relation to food staples and hashish) to medium-high (including illicit trafficking of arms and gold, and human smuggling and trafficking).

The presence of foreign criminal actors in Algeria is difficult to assess, as there are communities with strong regional bonds, through communal and family ties. Historically, foreign actors have played a role more akin to ‘interfaces’ or ‘intermediaries’, rather than immediate controllers, exerting moderate to substantial degrees of economic and financial power in domestic criminal markets.

However, there is increasing evidence that foreign actors are physically present in the country, particularly in the south, engaged in illegal gold extraction. While not necessarily exerting full control of these markets, foreign criminal actors – including Nigerien, Malian and Libyan nationals – are involved in four major markets: food and oil smuggling; human smuggling and trafficking; gold smuggling; and arms trafficking. Such actors are concentrated, and often established, in Tamanrasset. With regard to illegal gold trafficking, opportunistic Nigerien, Chadian and Sudanese traffickers have attempted to penetrate this market in Algeria.
Algeria overall has fairly high levels of resilience to organised crime, ranking 15th in Africa. Algeria maintains a strong law enforcement and military leadership against transnational organised crime. The country is the main security power in the region and often portrayed as a stabilising force. The security apparatus draws numerous parallels between the fight against organised crime and terrorism, which translates into a tough-on-the-ground approach towards criminal networks.

However, government transparency is low. Corruption, impunity and lack of transparency are three major national challenges, reflected by the country’s low score of 2.5 for government transparency and accountability.

Standards and systems for international cooperation are in place. Algeria has signed major international treaties related to organised crime. While cooperation with international forces in areas such as the crime-terror nexus is good, information sharing related to high-level tax evasion cases or common judicial trials is low. The domestic anti-organised crime legislative framework, however, is among the most developed in Africa. Strong and highly prohibitive laws for a wide range of organised crime types are in place but are often disproportionate to the nature of the crime.

Law enforcement agencies, including border control forces, are highly effective, and Algeria has deployed impressive law enforcement measures along its extensive borders. Law enforcement personnel are well trained, and the police’s special investigations crime unit has strong operational capacities. Nevertheless, this tough-on-crime policy sometimes leads to operational excesses.

There are significant inadequacies, however, predominantly with regard to the country’s judicial system and in the government’s capacity to address money laundering. The judicial apparatus in Algeria is weak and often at the mercy of the government in an environment in which judicial independence is the exception rather than the rule.

Overall, the judicial system in Algeria has shown limited capacity to bring high-level organised-crime figures to trial. And while established systems of reporting through financial intelligence units exist, they have been ineffective in blocking capital flight. The tax authority is not a key player, but improvements are expected in this sector.

Lastly, Algeria performs very poorly on social protection indicators of resilience, namely prevention measures, and victim and witness support in relation to organised crime. The implementation of Law 12-06 has undermined civil-society groups, with severe restrictions in terms of funding and capacity, and the legal space in which non-state actors can operate is shrinking.